On March 10th 1930, at about 09:30am, three men were killed instantly, and three injured, by an explosion caused by shotfiring igniting and exploding a pocket of gas that had accumulated in a crevice in the roof in the Silkstone seam of the old east district. At that time, the Colliery employed 1400 men underground and 462 on the surface. The Old East District in the Silkstone Seam was three-quarters of a mile from the Pit Bottom and was, working a section of coal between two old wastes, dating back to 1894 and 1920, respectively.

The three men killed were;
George Paley (Deputy) 38 from Main Street, Allerton Bywater
John Allen (driver) 25 from Main Street, Allerton Bywater
Arthur Richards (miner) 37 from Catlow Street, Castleford.

The three injured men were:

Albany Taylor (miner) 11 Blands Avenue, Allerton Bywater

William Townend (miner) Westfield Avenue, Allerton Bywater
Harold Collinson of Well Lane, Kippax who was not seriously injured.

Townend was conveyed to the surface on a stretcher but Taylor walked out.They were taken to Castleford and Normanton District Hospital where Taylor died later that night and Townend the following day.

The Yorkshire Evening Post – Monday March 10th 1930

The Leeds Mercury – Tuesday March 11th 1930

Report on the Causes of and Circumstances attending the Explosion which occurred at Allerton Bywater Colliery, Castleford, Yorkshire, on the 10th March, 1930.

Names of those killed.

George Paley.

Arthur Richards.

Albany Taylor.

William Townend.

John Allan.

Injured.

Harold Collinson, slightly injured by the force of the explosion.

INQUEST PROCEEDINGS.

The Inquests on the bodies of the five men who lost their lives were held by Mr. Will Bentley, H.M. Coroner, Pontefract.

The first day’s proceedings were formal identifications, but on the second day nine witnesses were heard and the fullest inquiry made into all matters relevant to the accident.

Messrs. The Airedale Collieries, Ltd., were represented by Mr. H. F. Atter, Solicitor, and the Yorkshire Mine Workers’ Association by Mr. A. Smith, Agent, and Mr. H. Smith, President of the Allerton Silkstone Branch.

Mr. George Cook, H.M. Senior Inspector of Mines, and I were present, and throughout the proceedings the coroner gave me full opportunity to examine all witnesses who were called.

The Jury returned a verdict that death was due in four cases to burns and in the fifth case (John Allan) to injuries, due to an explosion of methane ignited by the firing of a shot, no negligence being attached to anyone.

DESCRIPTIVE.

The mine is about 1½ miles North of Castleford and is owned by Messrs. Airedale Collieries, Ltd., for whom Mr. H. F. Smithson acts as Agent and Mr. F. W. Milsom as Manager.

Employment is given to about 1,400 men below ground and 462 on the surface.

The Silkstone Seam was cut by the shafts at a depth of 312 yards and a rising haulage road approximately three quarters of a mile long led to the Old East District in which the accident occurred.

Despite its name, the district was only started in April, 1929, to work out an area of coal between two wastes. Reference to the key plan on Plan No. 1 shows that the face was gradually extending as it advanced and had attained a length of 147 yards. There were six working places known from left to right as 11’s, 16’s, 15’s, 7’s. 101’s and 8’s, the numbers being those under which the collieries occupying the places were entered in the pay books. No. 8’s men had a slant gate and a new end-gate.

At the extreme right of this small district was a strip of waste, 33 yards wide, which had been worked in 1893 and 1894 by two roads leading to a district now abandoned, whilst at the left side of the face was the goaf of working places abandoned in 1920.

METHOD OF WORK.

The Old East District was worked longwall, end-on to the cleavage. A compressed-air-driven disc coal-cutting machine was used to undercut the face to a depth of 5 ft. 6 in.

The seam was 4 ft. 9 in. in thickness and it was the custom for the colliers to drill shot holes by hand about 18 inches from the roof at intervals along the face as they considered them necessary, except in the place at the right end of the face, where shotfiring was prohibited because of the broken nature of the strata due to the proximity of the strip of waste mentioned. In this place, 8s slant gate, coal was got down and ripping done with pneumatic picks.

The shot holes were charged and fired by a deputy.

The coal was loaded into tubs and trammed into the gate, whence it was taken to the rope haulage by horses. Two shifts, morning and afternoon, of coal getters were employed; the third shift being devoted to coal cutting and repairs.

Packs were built on each side of the gates from the material got down by ripping shots, but no intermediate packs were erected. Timber was drawn from the gobs, which were allowed to fall between packs normally 15 or 16 yards apart. As the immediate roof of the seam consisted of some 18 feet of fairly hard bind and there were stone bands above this, falls in the gobs did not occur regularly each time the back timber was withdrawn. The roof was liable to hang and 1)0 subject to periodic weights, which, however, were not so severe as to impede working to any great extent. These weights did, however, cause breaks right up to the coal face.

The breaks when near the face were closed, but as the face advanced they opened out and were left behind in the gob. At intervals an exceptionally large break showed displacement of the roof at the lower edges and, after a time, opened, allowing stones to fall out, leaving crevices, open joints and cavities in the roof of the gobs. These openings in the roof were not in evidence opposite packs and not so well exhibited in the gates as in the gobs. In short, the roof was only partially controlled by the supports.

The miners had Ceag electric hand lamps and the deputies Hailwood combustion tube flame lamps.

NARRATIVE OF THE ACCIDENT.

The normal complement of colliers, drivers, etc., was at work in the district on Monday morning, 10th March, 1930, and nothing unusual had occurred up to 9.30 am. The day shift deputy, George Paley, going along the face from left to right, had fired 8 shots before reaching 8’s end-gate (see Plan No. 1). There he had two shots to fire, one on each side of the gate. One shot was heard by men in the adjoining gate, No. 101’s, followed at an interval, estimated to be 5 minutes, by a flash “like lightning,” and flame was seen in 101’s gate and flame or the reflection of it in 15’s right bank.

From the right corner of the face to the main road, 15’s, the air was full of smoke and dust so dense that men could not see. Beyond that to the left end of the face there seemed to be only a thick dust cloud.

All persons immediately left the face and proceeded outbye to where the air was clear. Amongst these persons were two men badly burned, Albany Taylor and William Townend, from 8’s stall. Townend was conveyed to the surface on a stretcher, but Taylor walked out. Taylor died the same night and Townend the next day.

Rescue parties quickly found the body of John Allan, a pony driver, who had evidently been flung with violence out of 8’s slant gate against the side of 101’s gate and had many bones fractured.

Further rescue operations were delayed by the presence of thick smoke in 8’s gate and 8’s slant until the arrival of the Manager’, Undermanager and other officials, who tightened up brattice sheets and erected a sheet to replace a door which had been damaged by the explosion.

Ventilation removed the smoke in the course of half an hour and it was possible to recover the bodies of Arthur Richards, collier, and George Paley, deputy.

Underneath the body of Paley were found his own flame safety lamp and the electric lamps of Richards and Taylor. The magneto exploder was strapped to his waist, his explosive canister was by his side and his shot-firing cable stretched forward to a shot hole on time right side of 8’s end-gate. The detonator leads of the shot were fast in the shot hole and still attached to the shot-firing cable.

Signs of flame could be traced back almost to the outbye end of 8s slant, a distance of 184 feet, and for a distance of approximately I92 feet along the face, including the short length of open ground next the old waste.

The explosion had evidently been violent. It hurled the young man, John Allan, forcibly against the road side, although it is possible that he was already on the run when the force overtook him; it damaged a door in 7’s slant so that men passed through without opening it; it overturned colliers in 7’s and 15’s stalls and was felt as a violent gust of wind in 16’s and 11’s stalls. A youth, Harold Collinson, at the outbye end of 7’s slant, was peppered on the back by flying stones and injured, whilst pieces of bind were actually driven forcibly into timber at the end of 8’s slant gate.

It was fortunate that the men in 101’s gate had retired from the face to take a meal before the explosion occurred, or the casualty list would have been greater.

NATURE OF THE EXPLOSION.

The explosion was mainly a firedamp explosion: coal dust took little part in it.

Coal cuttings lay on the floor the whole length of the face and there was no reason, had the explosion developed into a coal-dust explosion, why it should have stopped before travelling half the face. It appeared, however, that coal dust did enter into the explosion to a small degree because slightly coked coal was found adhering to props all along the length travelled by the flame, and there was, in addition, a thin layer of brown ash over the whole length and on the sides of most of the roof fissures and cavities. Dust which burnt to ash must have added to the volume of the flame of the explosion.

Cutting was done to a depth of 5 ft. 6 in. in a 6 in. band of inferior coal known as “Whetstones,” at the foot of the seam. The floor of the working face was, at the time of the explosion, covered by cuttings to a depth of over one foot. There would undoubtedly be some coal dust amongst these cuttings, but mixed with a large proportion of larger particles of inferior coal.

Tests made by the Colliery Company showed that only 7.8 per cent, of the cuttings would pass through a mesh of 30 apertures per linear inch.

On the roads the natural stone dust in the district due to ripping operations, and the somewhat friable nature of the sides, rendered the application of further incombustible dust practically unnecessary, yet there was evidence that artificially made stone dust had been applied in sufficient quantities. A sample taken from the floor of 8’s slant, between 101’s gate and 8’s end-gate, i.e., in the length where the flame died away, was found to contain 36.0 per cent, of combustible material.

A sample from the sides in this length contained only 18.4 per cent. combustible matter.

Other roadway samples were equally satisfactory. Dust samples taken by the Colliery Company’s officials in 15’s gate on 4th March, 1930, gave-

Roof….. 11.01 per cent, combustible matter.

Sides….. 12.69 per cent, combustible matter.

Floor….. 18.78 per cent, combustible matter.

At the face conditions in this respect were not satisfactory. A Dust sample collected from the floor on 11th March, within a radius of 5 yards of the shot which caused the explosion, was found to contain 71.2 per cent, of combustible matter, indicating that the area had not received the thorough treatment with inert dust required by Clause 6 (f) (ii) of the Explosives in Coal Mines Order, though to some extent the reliability of this sample was impaired by the explosion and by disturbance caused by subsequent investigations.

A sample taken from the floor at the face over a length of 40 yards between 8’s and 7’s gates gave 59o2 per cent, combustible matter, and a sample from the sides in the same length gave 51.8 per cent. On this length 5 shots had been fired and no coal had been removed after they were fired, so that, except for the effects of the explosion, the results would be representative of the conditions after firing the shots. Most of this length should have been treated with inert dust had the shotfirer done his duty.

Samples taken over a length of 35 yards at the return end of the face where no shots had been fired showed: floor, 60 2 per cent. and sides 45.2 per cent, of combustible material, results not dissimilar to those obtained from samples taken in the area which should have been thoroughly stone-dusted.

VENTILATION AND OCCURRENCE OF GAS BEFORE EXPLOSION.

The mine was ventilated by a steam-driven Sirocco exhausting fan passing on 4th. March a measured quantity of 174,222 cubic feet of air at 3 inches water gauge.

On this date, according to the ventilation record book, a quantity of 5,837 cubic feet per minute was measured 100 yards from the first working place in the Old East District, Silkstone Seam. Reference to the key plan on Plan No. 1 shows that the air first ventilated six stalls in a small district to the north-east of the area where the explosion occurred.

The air reaching 8’s stall already contained about 0.4 per cent, of methane and had then done approximately half its work and had gathered up 23 cubic feet of firedamp per minute.

This current was turned into 101’s gate by a door and two sheets as shown on Plan No. 2 and further diverted into 8’s slant gate by two sheets in 101’s gate. The outbye sheet of the latter two was not as efficient as it might have been. There were gaps at each side and at the top.

There was an opening above the top of the second sheet. It was stated by colliery officials that it was unnecessary to have these sheets tight since no trouble had been experienced with firedamp in 8’s stall and it was undesirable to force all the air into it.

In 8’s end-gate, until the night before the explosion, there had been no sheet and air was free to travel to the face either by this gate or the slant gate. Presumably most of the air would travel the end-gate but the arrangement was said to work satisfactorily.

Inflammable gas had been reported by deputies on 30 occasions between 20th. November and 23rd. December, 1920, at 8’s ripping. This gas was found about the time when 8’s end-gate was being started from the slant gate. In three other reports on 9th. January, 1930, gas was reported giving off from a cavity in No. 8’s gate and it was cleared during the day shift the following day.

It is to be noted that whatever percentage of firedamp existed the deputies reported 2 per cent, invariably, but the height from the roof at which this percentage was found was stated thus:
“2 per cent, gas giving off 18 in. from top of ripping in 8’s” The explanation given was that they were complying strictly with General Regulation 16, viz.: “No person shall, when trying or examining for the presence of gas with a safety lamp, raise the lamp higher than may be necessary to allow the presence of gas to be detected.”

After 9th January no firedamp was reported until Sunday, 9th. March, when Ben Robinson, afternoon shift deputy, found 2 per cent, of gas 6 inches from the roof of 8’s end-gate between 10 and 11 p.m., and also a small trace of gas in 8’s slant gate. According to his statement he erected a hurdle sheet in the end-gate and after waiting a few minutes the gas was cleared away. He also opened a compressed air pipe in the slant gate and the gas there was cleared immediately. He then turned off the compressed air, leaving only a small leakage.

At 11.10 p.m., when he left the district, no gas could be detected and everything was in order. He reported where he had found firedamp and that he had cleared it to J. G. Bratt, the succeeding deputy, who stated that in neither of his inspections during the night shift did he detect any gas. Bratt stopped the leakage of compressed air in 8’s slant and reported the district to be clear during his examination prior to the admission of the men on the day shift of 10th March.

It is to be noted that from noon on Saturday, 8th. March, to 11 am. on Sunday, 9th. March, the main ventilating fan was slowed down to produce a water-gauge of 1.5 inches only. This implies a reduction of the ventilation to 70 per cent, of the normal, but actual measurements show that 80 per cent, of the normal passed, owing to the effect of natural ventilation.

From 11 a.m. to 4.30 p.m. on Sunday, the water-gauge was gradually raised to 3 ¼ inches, at which it was maintained until 10 p.m. From that time until the explosion the readings of the water-gauge recorder varied between 2½ and 3 ¼ inches.

It is perhaps a matter of no significance in this case that the fan Was slowed down for 24 hours, because all the evidence shows that the face was clear of gas at 5.30 am, on the Monday morning, but it is very undesirable that this practice should be followed systematically.

CAUSES OF THE EXPLOSION.

As the explosion followed immediately upon the firing of the tenth shot by the deputy, George Paley, who was killed in the position from which he fired it without having had time to move, the initiating cause would appear to be obvious. But in order to be quite certain all other possibilities have been investigated.

All the safety lamps in the affected area were recovered and sent intact to the Mines Department Testing Station, where Captain C. B. Platt, Superintending Testing Officer, subjected them to rigorous trials and pronounced them to be free from defect and safe for use in inflammable atmospheres of firedamp and air.

Analyses of samples of the explosive and tests of detonators from the same consignment as those used when the shot was fired showed that the explosive was correct in composition as a permitted explosive and that the detonators behaved satisfactorily.

The exploder used by the deputy, George Paley, was a three-shot dynamo electric machine of an old pattern which did not comply with the Explosives in Coal Mines Order and ought not to have been in use.

It was not provided, as required by Clause 2 (i) of the Order, with any form of switch, so that electric current was supplied throughout the travel of the handle of the machine and there was risk therefore of a shot being fired by accidental small movement of the handle.

The shot-firing cable was nothing better than two lengths of bell-wire roughly joined together. The shot-firing machine–not being a single shot machine fitted with a safety device to render the spark intrinsically safe in the presence of fire-damp–was capable under certain conditions of causing an explosion. These conditions were stated by Captain Platt to be : –

“(i) That some part of the insulation of each detonator wire had been destroyed;

• that the uninsulated parts of each wire were adjacent and nearly touching;
• that the shot was fired during the early stages of the handle’s rotation;
• that the uninsulated part of each detonator wire then came into contact either by: (a) movement caused by the shot; or (b) movement caused by the shotfirer;
• that the wires separated before the completion of the rotation of the driving handle, thus causing a ‘break-flash’ to occur at their bared portions.”

The possibility of all the above conditions having occurred within the half second required to turn the handle of the exploder seems in to me extremely remote.

No other electricity was in use in any part of the district.

Careful inquiry as to methods of searching and detailed scrutiny of the affected area for signs of matches or smoking materials eliminated the possibility of a light, struck for smoking purposes, having been the cause.

The coal cutting machine, operated by compressed air, was at the opposite end of the face and was not working at the time and, in consequence of the shot firing operations and meal time, it happened that no one was working at the face near the locus of initiation of the explosion. This effectually disposes of the chance that sparks from ordinary or coal cutter picks had ignited firedamp.

No compressed air jet was blowing in the locality at the time of explosion so that frictional electric sparks from that source may be ignored as a cause.

The last possibility, that sparks from falling rocks had been the igniting agency, is negated by the fact that there was no evidence of any but minor falls and the gob between 8’s end-gate and 8’s slant was still standing open. The roof and floor materials were not highly silicious and it would be difficult to create with them sparks capable of lighting fire-damp.

Having examined other causes the one originally mentioned remains the most likely and it may be stated that in all probability the explosion was initiated by the firing of a shot in the coal 6 yards to the right of the centre of No. 8’s end-gate. The shot hole was charged with Polar Dynobel and fired by a No. 6 detonator.

George Paley started that morning with 5 lb. of explosive in his canister. By questioning, observation, and counting the remaining detonators it has been found that the final shot was his tenth and there remained in his canister 20 ounces after the explosion. This works out at an average of 6 ounces per shot and agrees with the statements of colliers, for whom Paley had fired shots, that the charge used in coal was 6 ounces. It may be assumed, therefore, that the charge in the tenth hole was also 6 ounces, a fair and reasonable charge to use for the strength of the coal and the amount of work to be done.

Visual inspection showed that the coal in the vicinity of the shot hole bad been cracked and eased sufficiently, without displacing it to any great extent, to make the getting an easy matter. In the opinion of everybody who viewed the shot the explosive had just done its work and no more—in fact the shot was well balanced.

The explosive, in addition to cracking the coal face had blown out part of the stemming in a peculiar manner. The centre part of the stemming had disappeared, leaving a tube of clay round the bore of the hole. This tube was blackened on the inside with coal dust from that part of the hole which had been in contact with the explosive.

A barrel machine had been employed to drill the hole, which proved to be 4 feet in depth, and a prop was still standing, 3 ft. 6 in. from the mouth of the hole, bearing the indentation of the pointed end of the barrel of the machine.

On this prop, close to the indentation, clay was splattered, one piece being nearly 2 in. in diameter. Eighteen feet back from the shot, on a lowered canch of roof at a break, was another patch of clay 1½ in. in diameter, practically in line with the shot hole, (see section on Plan No. 1), whilst various other smaller splashes of clay were noticed.

Although the stemming had been blown out, the shot was not what is generally known as a blown out shot; it had done its work.

The coal had been cracked by a horizontal fissure about ¼ in. wide passing through the centre of the hole and when the coal was cut carefully away it was found that the clay tube left in the hole had fins on it where some clay had been forced by internal pressure into the opening fissure before the stemming was finally ejected and pressure released. It was also found that there were no breaks at the back of the hole where the products of combustion or flames could have escaped.

Several other shot holes which Paley had fired that morning were opened and had the same tubular effect. Stemming had been ejected from several of the holes in exactly the same way as at the tenth hole, and in one instance a solid plug of clay 6 in. long was found at the mouth of the hole with the tubular formation beginning at the inside of this plug.

Examination of the gateways showed that a number of ripping shots which had done their work well, had also ejected part of the stemming and in a few remains of such shot holes there were still to be found parts of tubular clay lining.

The insides of clay tubes in the ripping shot holes, as might be expected, did not show any blackening by coal dust.

In 16’s gate no fewer than six cases were noted where the explosive had done its work well but had blown out the stemming, or some of it, on to the sides and roof.

Clay only was used for stemming and was obtained from a surface clay hole. There was a heap of it at the junction of 8’s end- gate and 8’s slant gate. The consistency of the clay seemed excellent, neither too hard not too soft. Several of the colliers stated that it was their custom to make the clay into plugs for convenience in stemming and that the deputies stemmed the shot holes with wooden stemmers.

As it was not possible to make tests in the Silkstone Seam, an endeavour to discover the cause of the tubular formation of clay left in shot holes was made in the Beeston Seam, which

is somewhat stronger. Various charges from 6 ounces to 10 ounces were used in 4-feet holes with clay of different consistencies stemmed very lightly, but on no occasion was the stemming forced out in the way I have described. Further experiments appear to be desirable.

Whilst it is not possible yet to define the exact mechanism it seems clear that products of the explosive and possibly flame or tunities to travel through the sheets in 101’s gate and past the hurdle in 8’s end-gate without passing along the slant gate. There was every chance for gas to collect and it is known that firedamp was present the previous afternoon, probably due to the crush already mentioned.

It has already been stated that the quantity of firedamp entering the section with the air current was 23 cubic feet per minute. About five hours after the explosion it was found that 60 cubic feet of firedamp per minute was passing along the face at 15’s gate. This shows that the emission at the right side of the face was in the neighbourhood of 37 cubic feet per minute at that time.

At this rate it would take 14 minutes for the 517 cubic feet of pure firedamp necessary for the explosion to be given off, assuming that no gas was carried away by the air current.

With the air current that was passing, it is likely that the gas would only accumulate to a certain extent and would then be removed as fast as it was made. It is feasible that the full quantity of firedamp mentioned had been present in 8’s slant and 8’s slant face for an hour or two before the shot was fired.

In my opinion, therefore, there is strong circumstantial evidence that a large accumulation of firedamp in explosive proportions was present in the workings at the moment the shot was fired. This leads me to examine closely the evidence given at the Inquest as to the nature of the examination for firedamp which was made at that time by the deceased deputy, George Paley.

This evidence is somewhat conflicting, but on the whole it seems to me to point to the conclusion that while this examination was made it was not a full examination for a radius of 20 yards from the shot hole.

Bertie Milner, collier in 15’s stall, said that there were three shots fired in 15’s and that Paley examined only the ripping edge of the main gate and cross-gate before the first hole was stemmed. There was no sign of gas.

After the first shot Paley came back and examined at the ripping edges again, stemmed and fired the second shot. The process was repeated in regard to the third shot and the deputy then passed along the face to the next gate on the right.

Milner did not see the deputy make any examination for gas with his safety lamp at any other places than at the two rippings.

Alexander Stephenson, collier in 101’s stall, said he saw the deputy, Paley, fire three shots. Before the first was fired the deputy tested for gas with his oil safety lamp at the ripping and at the cracks in the roof of the gate.

He only saw the deputy make one examination for three shots but admitted that he was in the gate and did not pay particular attention to what the deputy was doing at the face.

If these statements correctly represent the procedure of the deputy Paley it is quite possible that on arriving at 8’s end-gate he made an examination for gas at the ripping lip, fired one

shot, examined again at the ripping and then fired the fatal shot without travelling to 8’s slant, which was well within a radius of 20 yards. but where there was no one working.

Time evidence of Charles Stephenson, who also worked in 101’s stall, to some extent discounts this theory. He stated :-

“I was with the deputy all the time. I was in the place when he arrived. he tested towards 7’s, then towards 8’s and then in the gate. He used an oil safety lamp but found no gas. He stemmed and fired the first shot. He tested again in the gate and up the sides of the face. He stemmed and fired the second shot. He tested again before he fired the third shot. The deputy tested about 10 or 12 yards from the shot hole towards 7’s gate and likewise towards 8’s gate and tested about 20 yards along the gate and at the ripping lip. He also tested at an old cut (weight break) and I think at the breaks at the side. I was with him and watched his lamp and saw no gas.”

The fact that the deputy was found lying dead on two electric lamps and his oil safety lamp suggests to me the possibility that he lost his light before firing the last shot and, having examined the ripping once, decided to complete the shot firing rather than go 300 yards to fetch his spare lamp.

Four hours after the explosion there was an accumulation of gas in 8’s slant gate and at the face down to the shot hole, of similar volume to that which is considered to have been present when Paley fired the shot. No. 8’s end-gate was then practically clear but a lighted flame lamp advanced cautiously towards the shot hole had to be withdrawn because of the presence of gas.

At 8’s end-gate, running from the face of the right pack to the face of the left pack was a break in the roof 11 feet from the face. It was 18 inches high and 4 inches wide and a safety lamp could be thrust up to the top of it but, when inside the break, the flame could no longer be seen to test for gas. It was not possible to make a proper examination for gas in this break or cavity.

At 8’s slant gate there was a break in a similar position. This break was wide at the bottom but narrowed upwards. It also could not be properly tested with a flame lamp, but that it was giving off fire-damp was demonstrated by a sample taken two feet up the break four days after the explosion.

The analysis of this sample showed : –

Methane————————— –71.84 percent.

Carbon dioxide—————– –0.85 percent.

Oxygen—————————- –3.87 percent.

In view of the presence of these breaks and their character it appears that the firing of a shot within 20 yards of them was a contravention of Clause 6 (f) (i) of the Explosives in Coal Mines Order.

Conclusions.

• The explosion was one of firedamp very slightly extended by coal dust.
• The explosion was of small extent but of violent nature, indicating that a highly explosive mixture was involved.
• The initiating cause was the projection of flame or burning particles from a shot in the coal face at the right side of 8’s end-gate.
• The cause of the peculiar manner in which the shot blew out part of its stemming has not been definitely ascertained.
• Circumstantial evidence, which is the only evidence available, points to the conclusion that the examinations for firedamp required by Clause 6 (f) (i) could not have been made to the full extent required by the Explosives in Coal Mines Order.
• Owing to the presence of breaks in the roof near the shot bole which could not be examined properly, the shot was one which should not have been fired.
• The provisions of Clause 6 (f) (ii) of the Explosives in Coal Mines Order regarding the thorough treatment with stone dust or water of the vicinity of shot holes were not observed by the shotfirer.
  

Hansard – 11th March 1930 – Commons Sittings – Coal Industry

EXPLOSION, CASTLEFORD.

HC Deb 11 March 1930 vol 236 cc1101-3

Mr. F. HALL

(by Private Notice) asked the Secretary for Mines whether he has any statement to make with regard to the explosion which took place at the Old Silkstone seam of the Allerton Bywater Colliery, Castleford, near Pontefract, Yorkshire, on Monday, the 10th March?

The SECRETARY of MINES (Mr. Ben Turner)

This explosion occurred about half-past nine yesterday morning in the Old East District of the Silkstone seam. I deeply regret to say that four persons lost their lives and that two others were burnt, one of them very seriously. From preliminary investigations by the Divisional Inspector of Mines, the explosion appears to have followed immediately after the firing of a shot in the coal at the end of a longwall face.

Further investigations are in progress, and will take some time, but I propose to present to the House at the earliest possible moment a full report by the Divisional Inspector on the causes and circumstances of the explosion. I will then consider whether any useful purpose would be served by a formal investigation.

The House, I know, will tender to the relatives of the deceased men their fullest sympathy and express their hopes for the speedy recovery of the injured and also their appreciation of the heroism displayed by all those engaged in the work of rescue and recovery.

MR. T. WILLIAMS

Seeing that we have now had four explosions within the past fortnight, does not the hon. Gentleman think that we are taking more risks in waiting for the absolutely perfectly automatic gas alarm than we would be if we applied a compulsory order forthwith?

Mr. TURNER
I would ask the hon. Member to wait for the Report. The Department are very much concerned at these continued explosions, and every effort is being made by the inspectors and by the Department to arrive at some conclusion that may make mining more safe.

MR. T. WILLIAMS

Will the hon. Gentleman undertake to guarantee to the House that the utmost expedition will be practised in endeavouring to secure what he calls the further test of the automatic alarm which is now in progress?

Mr. TURNER

I can assure the hon. Member that no time will be wasted in arranging the further tests which have been under consideration.

Mr. BUCHANAN
In view of the recurrence of these explosions, will the hon. Gentleman state what extra steps have been taken by his Department beyond those taken in normal times?

Mr. TURNER

I would rather have notice of that question.

Mr. BUCHANAN

In view of the recurring explosions, cannot the hon. Gentleman say that his Department are making special efforts other than would have been made some time ago?

Mr. TURNER

The Department are taking very special steps.

Mr. BUCHANAN

What are they?

Mr. TURNER

In one direction, we are asking owners of collieries to give every assistance possible to the practical improvements of gas detectors, so that thorough practical tests may be made; and we are hoping to have their cooperation, along with the co-operation of those engaged in the trade, to see what useful detectors can be applied.

Miss LEE

Does the hon. Gentleman not think that if inspectors underground were confined to the work of inspection, instead of being called upon frequently to do all sorts of onerous jobs, it would help in maintaining the state of the mines?

Mr. TURNER

As far as I am aware, the inspectors are doing inspectors’ work, and not extra work as suggested by the hon. Member.

Miss LEE

I hope that the Secretary for Mines knows that I mean safety men. If he desires further information, I shall be glad to supply it.

Mr. TURNER

Safety men are different men from inspectors, but I will look into the point which the hon. Member has made.

Sources;

The Yorkshire Evening post – 10th March 1930
The Leeds Mercury – 11th March 1930
Hansard – HC Deb 11 March 1930 vol 236 cc1101-3
Report on the Causes of and Circumstances attending the Explosion which occurred at Allerton Bywater Colliery, Castleford, Yorkshire, on the 10th March, 1930 BY E. H. FRAZER H.M. Divisional Inspector of Mines.
Glyn Edwards & Melvyn Watson – The Last Colliery In Leeds.
Eddie Downes – Yorkshire Collieries – Allerton Bywater Colliery
Roger Monks